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         Abstract 
 
Vanpaemel and Lee (2012) argue, and we agree, that the comparison of formal 
models can be facilitated by Bayesian methods. However, Bayesian methods 
neither precede nor supplant our proposals (Wills & Pothos, 2012), as Bayesian 
methods can be applied both to our proposals and to their polar opposites. 
Furthermore, the use of Bayesian methods to control for model complexity can 
be actively misleading when combined with the consideration of narrow data 
sets, and significant development work is required before Bayesian methods can 
be applied to some of the leading formal models of categorization. Even where 
Bayesian methods can be applied, the use of non-Bayesian methods is sometimes 
preferable due to their computational simplicity (Vanpaemel & Storms, 2010). 
We also clarify our position on arbitrarily variable parameters, and on the 
relationship between ordinal properties and overfitting.  
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Vanpaemel and Lee (2012) argue that the comparison of formal models of 
categorization can be facilitated by Bayesian methods of model selection. Despite 
some controversy over Bayesian methods (e.g. Gilboa, 2009), we tend to agree 
with this general point. Indeed, it is a point we have already made (Wills & 
Pothos, 2012, pp. 119-120). However, we disagree with many of the specific 
claims made by Vanpaemal and Lee, as we outline below. In brief, Bayesian 
methods can be applied in a manner inconsistent with our proposals just as 
easily as they can be applied in a manner consistent with them. 
In the target article (Wills & Pothos, 2012), we argued that model 
comparisons are most fruitful when relative adequacy is assessed by comparing 
well-defined models on the basis of the number and proportion of irreversible, 
ordinal, penetrable successes. The central concepts of this argument are 
therefore as follows: (1) that models should be well-defined, (2) that models 
should be penetrable, (3) that ordinal success is the primary goal (although not 
discounting the importance of quantitative closeness, Wills & Pothos, 2012, p. 
112), (4) that models should be compared on the number (and proportion) of ordinal successes, ȋͷȌ that models’ successes should be irreversible, in the sense 
of the avoidance of arbitrarily variable parameters (Wills & Pothos, 2012, pp. 
112-113). Vanpaemel and Lee (2012) recast our proposals as being about (a) 
avoiding over-fitting, (b) taking qualitative properties of data seriously, (c) 
reducing dependence on free parameters, and (d) testing empirical breadth.  
We note first that Vanpaemel and Lee’s (2012) recasting of our proposals 
is narrower than the original, choosing not to address the proposals that models 
should be well-defined and penetrable. They also elevate avoidance of over-
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fitting from one of a number of reasons for favoring ordinal properties (in our 
paper), to a central principle (in their Comment). Putting this elevation to one 
side, the substantive area of disagreement on over-fitting between us is that we 
asserted that ǲadopting ordinal adequacy as the primary measure of success also 
reduces (but does not necessarily eliminate) the risks of illusory model superiority due to overfittingǳ ȋWills, & Pothos, ʹͲͳʹ, p.ͳͳͳȌ, whereas they 
claimed that a complicated model can ǲover-fit different ordinal data patterns as 
easily as it can over-fit the quantitative detailsǳ ȋVanpaemel & Lee, 2012, p.18).  
The thinking behind our assertion was that the bulk of empirical investigation of 
psychological phenomena proceeds through the establishment of robust ordinal 
phenomena, and thus a model comparison process that concentrates on 
empirically robust phenomena would be at less risk of fitting noise, than one that 
attempted to fit the minutiae.  Vanpaemel and Lee provide no specific reasons to 
doubt this viewpoint. 
Of more concern is that Vanpaemel and Lee (2012) appear to have 
misconstrued the concept of irreversible success and its achievement through 
the avoidance of arbitrarily variable free parameters. Specifically, despite what is 
implied by their Comment, we did not endorse the idea that ǲparameter values are meant to change across experimental conditionsǳ ȋVanpaemel & Lee, 2012, p. ʹ͵Ȍ, nor did we advocate ǲfixing each to a single value before seeing the dataǳȋp. 
23). The former approach, as we argued in the original paper, negates most of 
the advantages of formal models over informal ones (Wills & Pothos, 2012, p. 
121). The latter approach is unrealistic, as Vanpaemel and Lee state and we 
agree. We did discuss an example where parameters could be removed from the 
Generalized Context Model (GCM) through the assumption that attention 
RESPONSE TO VANPAEMEL & LEE (2012) 5 
maximizes categorization accuracy (Nosofsky, 1984). In discussing this example, 
we did not state, and did not intend to imply, that it was necessarily possible to 
reduce the number of free parameters to zero. 
To use the terminology of the Comment, our proposal is that parameters 
should be global – in other words, they should be determined at the level of the 
domain of phenomena that the model is intended to address, not at the level of 
individual experiments. Determination of global parameters by parameter 
estimation is both reasonable and likely to be necessary.  In the original article, 
we noted the potential of hierarchical Bayesian methods for fitting individual 
and group average data simultaneously (Wills & Pothos, 2012, p.119).  In their 
Comment, Vanpaemel and Lee (2012) state that the same methods can also be 
used for the estimation of global parameters. We thank them for highlighting this 
important point.  
 We do not, however, endorse their statement that Bayesian methods provide ǲthe best current answersǳ ȋVanpaemel & Lee, 2012, p. 14) to the issues 
we had raised. Nor do we agree with their stronger expressions of this view, 
which might be taken to imply that Bayesian methods precede and replace the 
proposals we have made (in particular the final paragraph of their Comment 
seems to make this point).  To say that a method provides answers to these sorts 
of issues is much like saying a car tells you where to go on vacation. The driver, 
not the car, dictates the direction of travel. As noted, we accept that the Bayesian 
framework, in principle, provides tools for doing some of the things we believe 
are important – in particular, hierarchical Bayesian methods provide, in 
principle, a method for taking empirical breadth seriously. But, as Vanpaemel 
and Lee seem to accept (at least at one point, p. 27), Bayesian methods provide 
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only a framework. One can apply Bayesian methods to the fitting of narrow data 
sets with arbitrarily variable parameters just as easily as one can apply Bayesian 
methods in a way consistent with our proposals.  
Also, like all tools, Bayesian methods have the potential to be used inappropriately. We therefore disagree that ǲthe correct application of Bayesian inference automatically controls for model complexityǳ ȋVanpaemel & Lee, 2012, 
p. 27).  The use of methods that compensate for model complexity can be actively 
misleading, when combined with the currently prevalent approach of 
considering narrow data sets. It is not difficult to devise situations where a 
model is more complex than it needs to be to accommodate a narrow data set 
even where, in the context of a broader data set, the more complex model is the 
more adequate one.  
 A recurring theme of the Comment is that Bayesian methods not only 
have the potential to facilitate our proposals but that they have also already been 
used to do so. The latter statement, at least within categorization research, is 
largely inaccurate.  It is clear from the Comment (Vanpaemel & Lee, 2012, p. 27), 
and from other writings (e.g. Lee, 2008) that any learning model poses 
significant challenges for a Bayesian framework; challenges that, as far as we are 
aware, no one has yet surmounted within categorization. The class of learning 
models includes prominent categorization models such as ALCOVE (Kruschke, 
1992), COVIS (Ashby, Paul & Maddox, 2011) and SUSTAIN (Love, Medin & 
Gureckis, 2004). Thus it seems that there are significant technical challenges to 
overcome before Bayesian methods can be applied to comparison problems in 
the formal modeling of categorization.  In practice, we are not aware of any 
extensive model comparisons in categorization using Bayesian methods. Let us 
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hasten to add that we do hope that situation changes because, as we have 
already accepted, the Bayesian framework has clear theoretical advantages.  
Are there any situations where, if both Bayesian and non-Bayesian 
methods were available, one would favor non-Bayesian methods? According to 
Vanpaemel and Storms ȋʹͲͳͲȌ, the answer is ǲyes.ǳ Vanpaemel and Storms 
(2010) compared Bayesian and non-Bayesian methods of parameter estimation 
within the Varying Abstraction Model of categorization (VAM, Vanpaemel & 
Storms, 2008).  They concluded that the Bayesian method was ǲuncalled forǳ and 
that the non-Bayesian method was ǲjustifiedǳ ȋp. ͶʹͳȌ, largely due to the 
computational simplicity of the non-Bayesian method—and because of the fact 
that the variants of the VAM model were of comparable complexity to each other. 
At least at present, using Bayesian methods is simply more technically 
challenging (indeed, often requiring very specialized expertise) and time 
consuming than using non-Bayesian methods, and even advocates of Bayesian 
methods sometimes counsel against their use for this reason (as in Vanpaemel 
and Storms, 2010). We agree. 
 Vanpaemel and Lee (2012) also make the more specific claim that 
Bayesian methods have already been used to reduce dependence on free 
parameters in the evaluation of formal models of categorization, and they cite 
work on the VAM in support of this claim. However, this work is characterized by 
the independent estimation of model parameters for each of up to thirty 
different experiments (e.g. Lee & Vanpaemel, 2008), so it seems to have achieved 
little thus far in reducing reliance on arbitrarily variable parameters. The 
supportable aspect of Vanpaemel and Lee’s claim is that Bayesian methods 
provide a way of specifying prior assumptions about the distribution from which 
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parameters are drawn.  )n that sense, the parameters are not entirely ǲfreeǳ - 
there are some constraints on the relative likelihood with which values of 
arbitrarily variable parameters are selected. As the example of Vanpaemel and 
Lee (2008) illustrates, this does not prevent the parameters from being arbitrarily variable. And, of course, the parameters were never really ǲfreeǳ in 
the first place, as non-Bayesian methods have priors too. Bayesian methods just 
force one to be explicit about the priors. This is, of course, commendable. 
 One aspect upon which we entirely agree with Vanpaemel and Lee (2012) 
is the importance of taking the ordinal properties of data seriously. They are 
critical of our proposal in this regard mainly because we neglected to provide a 
specific formal method for doing so. The only specific suggestion made by 
Vanpaemel and Lee was to use parameter-space partitioning (Pitt, Myung, 
Montenegro, & Pooley, 2008), a procedure that was also briefly mentioned in our 
original article for other reasons (Wills & Pothos, 2012, p. 120). Parameter-space 
partitioning is a way of assessing model flexibility through an examination of the extent to which varying the model’s parameters changes the qualitative 
(typically ordinal) predictions that it makes. Hence, parameter-space 
partitioning takes the ordinal properties of data seriously, but it does not appear 
to directly provide a method of comparing formal models on the basis of the 
number of irreversible ordinal successes. 
 In summary, we agree that Bayesian methods provide some tools that 
might be useful in the pursuance of the proposals made in Wills and Pothos 
(2012).  However, Bayesian methods are general tools that could also be used in 
the pursuance of proposals largely opposite to the ones we set out. Furthermore, 
there are important challenges in the application of Bayesian methods, 
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compared to non-Bayesian ones, both regarding technical feasibility and 
practicality, and significant development work is required before they could be 
applied to some of the leading formal categorization models discussed by Wills 
and Pothos (2012).  We hope that such development work is carried out in due 
course and that it results in comparison tools that are available and accessible to 
a wide range of researchers.  
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